





     Working Paper
     
        WP 2010-231   
         
M R
R C    
 
Project #:  UM10-06 
The Effects of the Economic Crisis  
on the Older Population 






 The Effects of the Economic Crisis on the Older Population 
Michael D. Hurd 
RAND, NETSPAR, NBER and MEA 
Susann Rohwedder 
RAND and NETSPAR 
First version: September 2010 
This version: March 2010 
Michigan Retirement Research Center 
University of Michigan 
P.O. Box 1248 







This work was supported by a grant from the Social Security Administration through the 
Michigan Retirement Research Center (Grant # 10-M-98362-5-01).  The findings and 
conclusions expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the Social 
Security Administration, any agency of the Federal government, or the Michigan Retirement 
Research Center.   
Regents of the University of Michigan 
Julia Donovan Darrow, Ann Arbor; Laurence B. Deitch, Bingham Farms; Denise Ilitch, Bingham Farms; Olivia P. 
Maynard, Goodrich; Andrea Fischer Newman, Ann Arbor; Andrew C. Richner, Grosse Pointe Park; S. Martin 
Taylor, Gross Pointe Farms; Katherine E. White, Ann Arbor; Mary Sue Coleman, ex officio The Effects of the Economic Crisis on the Older Population 
Abstract 
We study the effects of the 2007-2009 recession on the population age 55 and older. Households 
in and near retirement have suffered sizeable losses in assets as a result of the economic crisis. 
There are a number of ways in which households might respond: reduce spending and with that 
increase saving, work longer, and/or bequeath less. Using longitudinal data from the Health and 














We are grateful for funding from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) via the 
Michigan Retirement Research Center (UM10-06). The opinions and conclusions expressed are 
solely those of the author(s) and do not represent the opinions or policy of SSA or any agency of 
the Federal Government.   2
1. Introduction 
 
The Financial Crisis that unfolded so rapidly in the latter part of 2008 developed into a 
recession that stands out from other recessions of the post-World War II era in several 
important ways.  First, and above all, the size of the swings in the economic environment 
were unequalled since the Great Depression.  Second, the crisis has affected several 
markets simultaneously (housing, stock and labor market), consequently providing a 
number of channels through which individuals and their households might be affected.   
The economic crisis and the subsequent increase in the unemployment rate have 
operated through several channels in ways that have affected people of different ages in 
differing ways.  The post-retirement population is vulnerable to negative shocks in the 
stock and housing markets because of their asset positions, and somewhat less obviously 
because of linkages to their children. But they are relatively unaffected by 
unemployment.  Furthermore, because of the importance of Social Security in the lower 
part of the income distribution, many of the less-well-off older households have been 
unaffected.  The older pre-retirement population has also accumulated stocks, and 
because of the transition from DB to DC pensions, their sources of retirement income 
security are subject to risk.  In addition, because of relatively high rates of labor force 
participation, they are vulnerable to unemployment:  If they lose a job, they have little 
time to recover from those losses.  In contrast to the retired population, those at the lower 
end of the income distribution are particularly vulnerable to unemployment.  A broad 
generalization is that the effects of the economic crisis are widespread, affecting 
individuals from all parts of the income distribution.  But it would seem that the retired 
population is actually likely to have suffered less than the pre-retired population. 
The aim of this paper is to study the effects of the financial crisis on the 
population age 51 or older.  We use longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS), a household data set that has observations from the time before the 
economic crisis began until it was well underway, with the latest available data point in 
2009.   
The housing market, after appreciating for some time, reached its maximum in 
May 2006. The stock market began to decline in October 2007. At first moderate, the   3
pace of the decline increased rapidly, coinciding with the troubles in the financial sector 
that began in September 2008.  By March 2009, it had reached its low point: The S&P 
500 had lost more than 50 percent from its peak 2007 level.  While stocks have recovered 
somewhat since that time, the housing market has not.  The HRS data—collected every 
two years since 1992—span this period.  Especially when combined with its 
supplemental data collections the HRS provides very rich information for the study of the 
effects of the financial crisis on older households:  in 2001 the HRS began collecting 
longitudinal data on household spending , which is repeated every two years; in 2009, 
much of the HRS Internet study content was dedicated to eliciting information relevant to 
measuring the effects of the financial crisis.  In this paper, we analyze changes in 





The data for this study come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  We use data 
from the 2006 and 2008 core surveys, as well as from two supplemental studies, the 
Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) and the HRS Internet Study.  The HRS 
is a biennial panel.  Its first wave was conducted in 1992, with the target population the 
cohorts born between 1931 and 1941 (Juster and Suzman, 1995).  Additional cohorts 
were added in 1993 and 1998, so that in 2000, the HRS represented the section of the 
population from the cohorts of 1947 or earlier.  In 2004, new cohorts were again added, 
making the HRS representative of the population age 51 or older.  
 
CAMS 
In September 2001, CAMS wave 1 was mailed to 5,000 households selected at 
random from households that had participated in HRS 2000.  In couples households, it 
was sent to one of the two spouses at random.  The fact that the CAMS sample was 
drawn directly from the HRS 2000 sample offered an important advantage: It allowed the 
CAMS data to be linked to the vast amount of information collected in prior waves of the 
HRS on the individuals and households who had been participating in the core survey.  In   4
 
HRS Internet Survey 
  The 2009 HRS Internet survey is the third wave in a series of Internet surveys of a 
subset of HRS respondents.  Eligibility to participate in the 2009 wave was determined 
by whether, in the core HRS survey in 2008, a respondent reported regularly using the 
Internet.  About 7,000 respondents qualified.
5  The resulting sample tends to over-
represent those with higher education, but this bias is less strong for those age 65 or 
younger in the HRS.  For this age group, Internet usage is more common throughout the 
distribution of both education and wealth.  We have rich background information from 
the HRS core survey for those who did not participate in the HRS Internet Survey. This 
information can be used to re-weight any results from the Internet Survey.  The field 
                                                 
1 CAMS 2005 included, in addition, a sub-sample of the newly added cohort of the Early Baby-Boomers 
that was first recruited into the HRS sample as part of the HRS 2004 core survey. 
2 See Hurd and Rohwedder (2006). 
3 The CEX collects the most detailed and comprehensive information on total spending by households. 
4 When compared with after-tax income in the HRS, the lower levels of spending in CEX imply that single 
persons accumulate wealth, whereas in panel, they decumulate wealth (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2009). 
5 The unit response rate in the first two HRS Internet Surveys (conditional on being invited to participate) 
was 70%. 
2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009, CAMS waves 2-5 were sent to these same 5,000 
households.
1  To facilitate panel analysis, the structure of the questionnaire was almost 
the same in each of these waves.  In this paper, we use CAMS data from all five waves.   
  CAMS asked respondents about their spending in each of 32 categories. This 
elicits almost the totality of spending according to the Consumer Expenditure Survey.  
The rates of item nonresponse were small. Some values could be imputed to zero with 
considerable confidence, due to the information in the linked HRS core data.  For 
example, some homeowners (as recorded in the HRS core) did not report a value in 
CAMS for “rent”; we imputed rent of $0 for these cases.
2  The resulting spending levels 
are close to totals from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the age groups 55-
74.
3  CAMS shows higher levels of spending than the CEX among those age 75 or over.  
There is no obvious reason that this difference should show in this age group, but not in 
the younger age group.  However, we believe that the higher CAMS totals are more 
accurate than those in the CEX because they better match observed rates of wealth 
decumulation at older ages.
4   5
period was March 2009 through August 2009.  For the purposes of this paper, we will 
refer to the data collection as having taken place in May 2009. 
The HRS Internet survey has a module on the economic effects of the crisis on 
individual households, as well as modules on health and life satisfaction. In this paper, 
we use responses about the crisis’s economic effects. We discuss the detailed items for 
analysis below, but broadly our approach is to find within-person changes in important 
outcomes that have resulted from the crisis.  
 
3. Effects of the Crisis on the Economic Circumstances of HRS households 
  A broad gauge of the scale of the impact of the economic crisis is the simple 
response to a question about whether a respondent has been affected.  About 28% of 
respondents report that they have been affected a lot, about 46% say they have been 
affected a little, and just 26% report not having been affected.   
 
Effects on Consumption 
  According to the standard economic model, consumption is a better measure of 
economic well-being than income or wealth.  We expect that households reduced 
consumption in response to the crisis.  The HRS Internet survey asked respondents how 
their spending compared with a year earlier.  In May 2008, prices in the housing market 
had begun to decline, but the stock market was still at a relatively high level; the large 
declines in stocks began later in the year.  Unemployment was at 5.4%, although it had 
been increasing.  Accordingly, from the typical household’s point of view, the economic 
crisis was still in the future.   
Table 1 shows the percentages of respondents indicating in May 2009 that their 
spending had increased, decreased, or remained the same compared with a year earlier.  
In normal times, we would expect that for the younger age groups, spending would 
increase over a year. Indeed, that is what we observe in cross-section spending data.  
However, among respondents in their 50s, more than 30% said their spending had 
decreased, whereas about 15% said it had increased. At post-retirement ages, however, 
the pattern reverses, which is a first indicator that the older population was better 
protected from the effects of the crisis.   6
  The Internet survey contained follow-up questions to assess more directly the 
importance of various reasons for any changes in spending for respondents who reported 
having lowered their spending. Table 2 shows the percent that stated that a stated reason 
for reducing spending was very important or somewhat important.  Averaged over all 
ages, 85% of respondents indicated that being worried about the economic future was an 
important factor.  Although the differences by age are not large, in the oldest age group 
that percentage was somewhat lower.   
There is considerable disagreement in the literature about whether households 
change their spending in response to movements in asset prices such as stocks or housing.  
About half of respondents who had decreased spending attributed their actions to declines 
in asset prices (stocks and housing).  With regard to the other reasons, there is a clear age 
gradient:  The older population is less likely to have reduced spending because of the 
need to reduce debt, having a lower income, or rising unemployment levels.   
  In a similar manner, the Internet survey asked those respondents who said their 
spending had increased for the importance of various reasons.  Broadly speaking, 
spending could increase due to greater economic resources (a positive reason) or due to 
need (possibly a negative reason).  Table 3 shows the distribution of responses among 
those who said spending had increased.  Almost all respondents cited increased spending 
needs.  About half of the respondents were optimistic about their economic future—in 
sharp contrast with those who had reduced spending (Table 2).  It is notable, however, 
that among those age 55-64, fewer had increased spending because of optimism. Because 
just 15% of this group had increased their spending (Table 1), the fraction of the total age 
55-64 population that spent more because of optimism is only about 6%. 
  About 1/3 of the 55-64 year olds cited better employment as a reason for 
increasing spending, compared with a negligible percentage in the oldest age group, those 
age 75 or older, who are mostly already retired.  About 30% of those 55-64 attributed 
more spending to higher mortgage payments.  This is in line with an increase in average 
housing debt (which we will examine directly below), and possibly with balloon 
mortgages that were a frequent financing instrument during the housing-market bubble. 
  All of these changes in consumption observed in the Internet survey are self-
assessed. While a respondent may have good qualitative knowledge of the changes he or   7
                                                 
6 These are derived from the ratios of mean and median spending.  The mean of household-level spending 
change is not a good indicator of population spending change because observation error causes bias in the 
ratio. 
7 On average the two-year changes in household size among the 50-64 year old households show a decline 
of 6% for the 2001-2007 period. 
she had made, he or she is considerably less likely to have a good quantitative 
assessment.  Accordingly, to quantify the magnitude of spending declines, we use 
CAMS.  Our method is to compare two-year panel transitions in spending in “normal” 
times with two-year panel transitions during the economic crisis.  We define normal 
times to be 2001-2007 and the time of the economic crisis to be 2007-2009.  We average 
three panel transitions in spending (2001-2003, 2003-2005, and 2005-2007) so as to 
smooth out noise in the data and average out other macro shocks.  We disaggregate by 
age band because the older population may have been better protected, as suggested by 
the self-assessed differences in changes in spending shown in Table 1. 
  Table 4 shows the changes in mean and median spending both in total and in 
nondurables, adjusted for price change.
6  Among those age 50-64, mean total spending 
declined by about 2.1% every two years, averaged over the period 2001-2007. This 
reduction is likely due to a number of reasons, such as changes in household composition 
or parental support for children’s education.
7  The decline in mean nondurable spending 
among this age group was about 1.0% per two-year period.  Among those age 65 or 
older, the reductions were much greater: 6.3% in mean total spending and 4.9% in mean 
nondurable spending.  These reductions are likely life-cycle effects.  During the 
economic crisis, consumption fell at a much greater rate—almost 10% in the younger age 
group and 9% in the older. The levels and changes in the medians are smaller, but the 
patterns are the same. 
  We summarize and compare the two age groups in Table 5.  Among those age 50-
64, mean spending declined between 2007 and 2009 by 7.6 percentage points more than 
between 2001 and 2007.  Among those 65 or older, spending declined by 3.4 percentage 
points more during the later period than in the earlier.  Our interpretation is that, indeed, 
spending declined in response to the economic crisis, and that the comparisons of actual 
measured spending are consistent with the self-assessments in Table 1.  Furthermore, 
consistent with our expectations that the older population was better protected against the   8
                                                 
economic crisis and the self-reports of Table 1, spending by the older population declined 
less during the crisis than spending by the younger population. 
 
Effects on Housing 
  Whether homeowners were affected by the large drops in home values, and how 
seriously they were affected, depends on where they live and when they bought their 
home.  According to the Case-Shiller 20-city average, prices peaked in May 2006 at 
about 50% above the level at which they had been at the beginning of 2003.  But this 
average conceals substantial intercity variation.  In Denver there was a moderate increase 
in housing prices, followed by a small decline. In Los Angeles and Phoenix, prices 
peaked at more than 100% above their 2003 value and have since declined by more than 
50%.  In this sense, a family living in Denver would be relatively unaffected by price 
changes. But in contrast, a family living in Los Angeles or Phoenix might be affected, 
depending on the purchase date, method of financing, and the family’s overall economic 
situation.  For example, a family that bought a house in 2003 and took on a mortgage that 
was reasonable in relation to family income could have sound finances today, even 
though the value of the home has now dropped below its 2006 peak.  However, if a 
family bought at the top of the market with a small percentage down-payment and a 
balloon loan, that family would now find itself with substantial negative home equity and 
increased mortgage costs that it might not be able to afford. 
The HRS asks respondents about the value of their houses, both in the core survey 
and the Internet study.  These data have the advantages of being reports on the same 
house over time and being nationally representative.  Other commonly used data sources 
are based on recent actual property sales (possibly including refinanced properties) or in 
the Case-Shiller index, confined to 20 large cities.  
Over several waves of the HRS, the rate of homeownership (assessed in panel) 
has been constant at almost 90%. Table 6 shows mean and median house values, and 
mean and median housing debt as reported by HRS respondents in 2006, 2008, and 2009.  
The mean house value declined modestly between 2006 and 2008 at about 4% per year, 
and the median changed very little.
8  Between 2008 and the HRS Internet survey, on 
8 These price changes are not directly comparable with the Case-Shiller which is confined to 20 large cities.   9
                                                 
average about nine months later, the decline was about 9%.  The decline in the median 
was about 11%.  These are, of course, very substantial reductions in the most important 
asset of most households.  The mean value of housing debt (summing any mortgage 
balances and other outstanding home loans) was almost constant between 2006 and 2008, 
and the median did not change.  However, in just the short period between the 2008 HRS 
core interview and the HRS Internet interview, the mean value of housing debt increased 
by about $5 thousand or 7% while the median remained once again unchanged.  The 
increase in the mean could be due to equity extraction, which may have made the 
household more vulnerable to other economic shocks such as unemployment.  When 
combined with the reduction in house prices, the debt to value ratio had a large increase 
between 2008 and the Internet survey. 
Table 6 is calculated in panel over all households that reported owning a home in 
all three surveys.
9 But it includes some who did not fully report actual values for house 
price and for the mortgage or other home loans.  Most of the non-reporters reported a 
bracket.  We exclude in Table 7 anyone with an imputed value because we want to report 
the fraction of households with negative housing equity:  The imputation of a value even 
within a bracket could falsely classify some as having more mortgage than house value.  
A comparison of Table 7 with Table 6 shows that excluding respondents who reported 
incompletely does not materially affect the conclusions we make about the trends in 
home value and housing debt on average.
10  The table shows that in 2006 and 2008, about 
1.1 – 1.4% of homeowners owed more than their house was worth.
11  Among 
homeowners with a mortgage,1.8 - 2.4% had negative equity.  But by 2009, 3.9% of all 
homeowners had negative equity and 6.7% of those with a mortgage had negative equity.  
 
House price expectations 
  As reported in Table 2, an important reason for a reduction in spending was 
worries about the economic future.  We assess one component of expectations about the 
9 In defining the sample we do not allow any imputed information on home ownership, nor on whether the 
household has any mortgage or other home loans. 
10 Note that median housing debt shows a decline in Table 7 between 2006 and later years, which we do not 
observe in Table 6. We place more weight on the evidence in Table 6 which is based on a larger sample 
(not excluding incomplete reports for amounts).   
11 These percentages of homeowners with negative equity are more representative of the population than 
those obtained from sources such as lenders or property records which are either incomplete or outdated.   10
                                                 
12 Calculated as the percentage of 12-month intervals over which the housing price index increased between 
January 1, 1991 to November 1, 2009. 
13Calculated as the percentage of five-year intervals over which the housing price index increased between 
January 1, 1991 to November 1, 2009. 
economic future, house price expectations.  Respondents are asked about expectations 
that their own home will appreciate in price in the form of a subjective probability as 
follows: 
On a scale from 0 percent to 100 percent where 0 means that you think there is no 
chance and 100 means that you think the event is absolutely sure to happen, what 
do you think are the chances that by next year at this time your home will be 
worth more than it is today? 
In follow-up questions, respondents were asked about additional price targets, such as an 
increase in value of 10 or 20% or a decrease in value of 10 or 20%. Respondents were 
also asked the same question with a time horizon of five years.   
Table 8 shows the average of those subjective probabilities.  The average 
subjective probability that respondents’ houses would be worth more in a year than they 
are today is just 32%.  This indicates that individuals are very pessimistic about the 
housing market, and these expectations are very much different from historical 
frequencies of house price gains.  In 88% of one-year intervals between 1991 and 2009, 
housing prices increased.
12  Individuals are somewhat more optimistic over the five-year 
horizon:  There the average subjective probability is about 54%.  But the discrepancy 
with the historical record is even greater, as in every five-year interval between 1991 and 
2009 housing prices increased.
13  Most likely, such pessimistic expectations are a partial 
explanation for the decline in spending reported in Tables 1 and 4. 
 
Stock market expectations 
  Using the same format as for house price expectations, respondents are asked 
about the chances the stock market will be higher in a year.  This question was asked in 
both HRS 2008 and in the HRS Internet survey, so we can make a direct panel 
comparison.  Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of the reported subjective 
probabilities of any gain. The distribution for 2009 is shifted to the left of the distribution 
for 2008, showing a reduction in the average expectation of any gain.  Indeed the average   11
subjective probability declined from 52 percent probability in 2008 to 41 percent 
probability in the HRS Internet survey.  The decline was particularly striking at the lower 
part of the distribution.  At the 25th percentile, the subjective probability was 40 percent 
in 2008. But it was just 20 percent in 2009.  As with housing prices, such pessimistic 
expectations may explain some of the spending decline. 
 
Subjective Bequest Probabilities 
  Using the same format as for the subjective probabilities of housing price gain 
and stock market price gain, HRS asked respondents about the probability they will leave 
a bequest greater than $10,000.  If this reported probability is positive, the question is 
repeated with a target of $100,000 and then with a target of $500,000.  In cross-section, 
these subjective bequest probabilities vary positively with wealth, which increases our 
confidence that they are predictive of actual bequests.  We expect some of the losses of 
assets between 2008 and 2009 will result in lower bequests as well as lower consumption.  
  Table 9 shows the implied distribution of probability mass in the population in 
each of the wealth intervals.  Averaging over all responses, the probability of a bequest 
less than $10,000 was 16.2 percent and the probability of a bequest between $10,000 and 
$100,000 was 19.8 percent.  It is clear that between 2008 and 2009, the probability mass 
shifted toward the lower wealth bands, reflecting the loss of wealth. 
  We calculate expected bequests by multiplying the expected bequest within a 
wealth band by the probability of a bequest in that interval and then summing over all 
intervals.  The expected bequest within an interval is calculated from the observed 
distribution of wealth in that interval in the 2008 HRS.  The average wealth in the 
interval 0 to $10,000 was $1,808, and the expected contribution to bequests from that 
interval was $292.  Summing over all intervals, we find that expected bequests declined 
from $536 thousand in 2008 to $436 thousand in the HRS Internet survey.  Of course this 
reduction is entirely dominated by the top interval, which is a result of the highly skewed 
distribution of wealth. 
 
Effects on Retirement   12
                                                 
  The interval between the HRS 2008 interview and the 2009 Internet interview was 
too short to observe many actual retirements.  However, over many waves, HRS has 
asked workers about retirement expectations (in the form of the subjective probability of 
working past age 62 and age 65).  We call these subjective probabilities P62 and P65.  
They are predictive of actual retirement (Hurd, Reti and Rohwedder, 2009) and they have 
an advantage over data on actual retirement because changes in the subjective probability 
control for individual fixed effects, such as unmeasured permanent taste differences.  
Such fixed effects are difficult to control for when using data on actual retirement.  
  We expect that the financial crisis would have had two opposing effects on 
retirement.  The declines in stock and possibly housing values should have delayed 
retirement because of the unexpected loss of wealth.  Yet the worsening of the labor 
market and increased risk of unemployment should have led to earlier expected 
retirement because the older population often has more difficulty finding a job after a 
period of not working.  The net effect is an empirical matter.  
  Table 10 shows averages of P62 for the population of workers in HRS 2008 who 
were respondents in the Internet interview.
14  The average increased from 58.2% to 
61.7%.  This is a large increase over a short time period—a little more than a year for 
some respondents; less than six months for others.  To put that change in perspective, the 
labor force participation rate of the older population has been increasing during the 1990s 
and particularly in the 2000s: In 2003 the rate among those 60-64 was 51%, and was 
54.1% in 2008.  The increase over five years was 3.1 percentage points, about the same 
as the increase in P62 over six to 12 months.  If the future actual labor force participation 
is well-predicted by P62, these data suggest an acceleration of the trend toward higher 
participation. 
  We note, however, that the stock market reached its low in March 2009— just a 
month before the HRS Internet survey was initially fielded.  Since then, it has recouped 
some of its earlier losses, so possibly some of the negative effect of the stock market on 
wealth has dissipated.  Also, the unemployment rate today is slightly higher than during 
the Internet survey. But most importantly, any expectations among respondents at the 
14 In HRS 2008 P62 was only asked of workers less than age 62.  In the Internet survey it was asked 
irrespective of labor force status so that we have responses from people who had stopped working between 
the two surveys as well as from those who were still working.   13
time of the survey that the unemployment rate would recover quickly were not realized.  
Instead, the mood about the labor market is likely worse today than in May 2009.   
 The  table  shows  P62 both in HRS 2008 and in 2009 according to work status in 
the 2009 Internet survey.  There are 145 individuals who were working in 2008 and so 
were asked about P62, but who were not working at the time of the Internet survey.  
When they were working in 2008, their average P62 was just 44.7%.  That low value 
compared with P62 among those who were still working in 2009 shows the power of P62 
to predict future labor force participation.  But a striking comparison is between the 
change in P62 across the two groups:  Among those who continued to work, P62 
increased by 5.0 percentage points;  among  those who stopped working, P62 declined by 
4.4 percentage points.  This difference in the change may well reflect the differing effects 
of the stock and housing market losses and of the worsening of the labor market. 
  Table 11 has similar statistics, but with respect to working past age 65.  
Qualitatively we find the same patterns as for P62: an overall increase in P65, which is 
driven by increases among those working in 2008 and 2009 and which offsets declines 
among those not working in 2009.  However, the magnitude of the increases is much 
greater for P65.  The increase in P65 is quite remarkable, being a little over double the 
increase observed in P62, amounting to an increase of 7.8 percentage points (from 38.6 to 
46.4).  Putting it in historical perspective, the labor force participation rate among those 
65-69 was 23.0% in 1999.  By 2008, it had risen to 30.7%—a change of 7.7%.  Thus the 
increase in the predicted labor force participation rate in just nine months of the economic 
crisis was about the same magnitude as the actual increase over nine years. Even if 
respondents have revised their expectations about working past age 65 since May 2009 
when the HRS Internet interview was fielded—possibly due to increases in the stock 
market and worsening of the labor market since then—it is unlikely that P65 will have 
returned to its 2008 levels.  That would suggest that the economic crisis will accelerate 
the trend of the past two decades of increased labor force participation among the older 
population. 
   14
  The stratification by work status in 2009 reveals another difference with P62:  
The levels of P65 in 2008 were much more comparable (just a 6 percentage point 





In this paper, we have studied the effects of the 2007-2009 recession on the 
population age 55 and older.  In the course of the financial crisis that turned into the 
Great Recession, households suffered substantial losses in stocks and housing. Such 
losses particularly affect the retirement security of those in or nearing retirement. While 
stock values have recovered somewhat since their low point in March 2009, house prices 
have not.  For the majority of households, housing is the most important asset.  As the 
housing bubble grew, some households extracted home equity–also in this older 
population.  As a result, housing debt increased at the mean – although not at the median 
– continuing to rise even between 2008 and 2009.  The fraction of homeowners with 
negative home equity about quadrupled.  In May 2009, individuals were pessimistic that 
house and stock prices would recover any time soon (i.e., over the next year).  Both 
actual losses and pessimism led many households to reduce spending. But this trend was 
less pronounced among households age 65 and older—likely because this age group 
tends to have more home equity, and Social Security, an important part of its income, was 
unaffected by the economic downturn. This is in contrast to younger groups in our 
sample, who still rely on income from earnings.  With wealth positions substantially 
reduced, it may be that households will pass on less wealth to the next generation.  
According to respondents’ subjective beliefs, this will be the case and the reductions may 
be sizeable (about 20 percent on average).  The median household will not see much 
change, because the effect is concentrated among households with high wealth.  
 The past 20 years have witnessed an increase in labor force participation among 
the older population.  On the one hand, the economic crisis has lead to increased 
unemployment among older workers, causing some earlier-than-anticipated retirement.  
But at the same time, workers expect to be working longer, compared with before the   15
crisis.  Overall, the economic downturn appears to have accelerated the trend of increases 
in labor force participation seen over the past 20 years.  For the Social Security and 
Medicare programs, this accelerated trend will relieve some of the financial pressures 
they now face.  Both programs will benefit from additional tax revenues when people 
work longer.  Only Social Security will have to pay out higher benefits in return, but 
these will amount to less than the additional revenues.  If anything Medicare benefit 
payments may be lower due to some workers having employer-based health insurance, in 
which case Medicare is the second payer.  
In sum, the economic crisis has caused households in and near retirement to suffer 
sizeable losses in assets.  These households responded in several ways:  they reduced 
spending and with that increased saving, they intend to work longer, and anticipate to 
bequeath less.   
   16
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Table 1:  Household spending now compared to a year ago 
  
Age Increased  About  the  Decreased All 
same 
55-64 14.7  52.7  32.6  100.0 
65-74 19.2  56.7  24.1  100.0 
75+ 23.9  59.3  16.8  100.0 
        





Table 2:  Important reasons for spending decline by age band, 
               percent stating very or somewhat important 












55-64  74.5 76.4 53.7 56.3 53.4  86.4 
65-74  63.6 71.8 36.9 65.7 48.9  82.1 
75+  46.5 59.0 14.2 64.6 42.2  80.0 
         






Table 3:  Important reasons for spending increase by age band,  
     percent stating very or somewhat important 










55-64  42.8  32.2 31.4 92.3  42.7
65-74  36.9  15.4 27.8 96.2  63.9
75+ 20.8  7.0  11.6  96.0  51.6 
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Table 4: Two-year change in real consumption (%), 2001-2007 average and 2007-2009 
  Percent Change in Means  Percent Change in Medians 
 2001-2007  2007-2009  2001-2007  2007-2009
Age 50-64        
Total consumption  -2.1  -9.9  -2.3  -7.5 
Nondurable 
consumption -1.0  -8.6  -0.6 -7.3
Age 65+   
Total consumption  -6.3  -9.1  -3.3  -5.9 
Nondurable 








Table 5:  Summary of two-year change in nondurable spending (%) 
 Means  Medians
 50-64  65+  50-64  65+ 
2001-2007 -1.0  -4.9  -0.6  -3.0
2007-2009 -8.6  -8.3  -7.3  -6.4
2007-2009 change 
minus average of 2-
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Table 6:  Home values and housing debt balances, panel [in thousand dollars] 
Home value  Housing debt    
N=2,630  N=2,630 
Year Mean Median Mean Median 
2006 331.5  230.0  75.5  30.0 
2008 306.0  225.0  73.9  30.0 
2009 277.9  200.0  79.1  30.0 
Notes: Only households who report owning a home in all three years are included and 
for whom there is no missing information on whether they have a mortgage and on 
whether they have other home loans.  Housing debt includes the value of any 
mortgages and other home loans on the primary residence. Imputed values allowed on 
amounts.  Constant weights used for all statistics (2008 household weights) to ensure 
that variation in statistics across waves is not due to cross-wave variation in weights. 
Some of the entries in this table differ from an earlier version because the earlier version 




Table 7: Home values, housing debt and negative home equity in panel 
 
Year 
Home Value  Housing Debt  Negative Home Equity (%) 
Mean  Median Mean Median  All  Only households 
homeowners  with housing debt* 
2006 334.6 250.0  79.7  37.0  1.1  1.8 
2008 316.1 240.0  76.7  32.0  1.4  2.4 
2009 287.5 220.0  82.7  30.0  3.9  6.7 
Notes: Same sample as in Table 6, but imposing the additional restriction that none of the 
amounts are imputed.  N=2,106.  
*Number of households with housing debt varies across waves:  1,006 in 2006; 951 in 2008; 
1,111 in 2009.   
Some of the entries in this table differ from an earlier version because the earlier version 




  Table 8:   House price expectations, one year and five years ahead 
  1 year from now  5 years from now 
Any increase  32.3  53.5 
Increase by 10% or more  21.3  47.0 
Increase by 20% or more  10.6  28.0 
Decrease by 10% or more  18.5  13.7 
Decrease by 20% or more  11.0  9.2 
N 1,820 1,723
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wealth  Expected bequests 
2008  2009  in 2008  using 2008  using 2009 
probabilities  probabilities 
0 to <$10k  16.2  23.9  1,808  292  432 
$10k to <$100k  19.8  20.2  52,125  10,316  10,549 
$100k to <$500k  35.2  33.4  271,660  95,697  90,843 
$500k or more  28.8  22.4  1,489,849  429,211  334,172 
      
All   100.0  100.0  706,385  535,517  435,996 
N=3,061 
 




Average subjective probability of working past age 62 among 
those working in 2008, age 51-61 
    Work status in 2009 
 All  Working Not  working 
HRS 2008  58.2  60.9  44.7 
HRS 2009 Internet  61.7  65.9  40.3 
N 1062  917  145 
Note:  Average for “all” is not equal to the weighted average of “working” and “not working” when the 







Average subjective probability of working past age 65 among 
those working in 2008, age 51-61 
    Work status in 2009 
 All  Working Not  working 
HRS 2008  38.6  39.6  33.4 
HRS 2009 Internet  46.4  49.5  30.8 
N 1056  911 145
Note:  Average for “all” is not equal to the weighted average of “working” and “not working” when the 
weights are the sample sizes.  The average for “all” uses the HRS person weight adjusted for the Internet 
interview. 
   22






















0 2 04 06 08 01 0 0
Subjective probability
2008
2009
 
 